Shaykh al-Alawi - A Defence of the Honour of Sufism

Among the works of the eminent Sufi master Shaykh Ahmad ibn Mustafā al-ʿAlāwī al-Mustaghānimī is the epistle al-NāSir Maʿrūf fī al-dhabb ʿan majd al-taSawwuf, presented here as Nāsir Maʿrūf: A Defence of the Honour of Sufism. 
 
According to the manuscript catalogue of the Mostaganem zāwiya, Shaykh al-ʿAlāwī published this rebuttal in 1929, under the pen name al-Nāsir Maʿrūf, in issues 103 to 108 of al-Balāgh al-Jazāʾirī.[1] Shaykh Muhammad ibn al-Hāshimī al-Tilimsānī later gathered the articles into an epistle, which appeared as a separate publication in 1931. The rebuttal answers an article in issue 174 of al-Shihāb by a scholar who taught in the Prophet’s Mosque. 
 
The word “defence” renders al-dhabb and reflects the character of the work. This is no systematic treatise on every aspect of Sufism. It is a reasoned defence, answering accusations, weighing the evidence advanced against Sufism and inviting a fair assessment of a spiritual tradition that the shaykh believes has been unjustly attacked. The word majd conveys honour, nobility, greatness and dignity. The title therefore preserves both the act of defence and the dignity at stake in the Arabic original. 
 
An Epistle Born of Controversy 
 
The book arose from a controversy. The article to which Shaykh al-ʿAlāwī replies set out to portray Sufism as a blameworthy innovation and a path of deviation. To support that position, its author cited statements attributed to leading imams and severely criticised several major figures in Muslim spirituality. 
 
Shaykh al-ʿAlāwī does not simply respond with an affirmation of his faith in Sufism. He takes his opponent’s arguments seriously, examines them one by one and discusses the sources on which they rest. 
 
He pays particular attention to Ibn al-Jawzī’s Talbīs Iblīs[2], on which his opponent relies heavily. He then considers sayings attributed to imams of the stature of Mālik ibn Anas, al-Shāfiʿī and Ahmad ibn Hanbal, pointing out the difficulties and contradictions in some of these reports and asking what they actually establish and how they are used in the dispute. 
 
Here one of the defining features of Nāsir Maʿrūf becomes clear. The shaykh means both to defend Sufism and to recall how a scholarly dispute should be conducted.

A statement does not become evidence merely because it is ascribed to an imam. One has still to ask how it was transmitted, what it means, what its context was, what exactly it concerns, and whether it accords with other statements reported from the same imam. That demand runs through the epistle. 
 
Can an Entire Path Be Judged by the Faults of Some of Its Followers? 
 
One of the book’s central questions is particularly important to understanding the shaykh’s approach. 
 
He does not deny that errors, excesses or objectionable practices may have arisen among some who claim to follow Sufism. His question is a different one. Can we attribute these faults to Sufism itself without showing that they actually follow from its principles? 
 
Shaykh al-ʿAlāwī’s answer is plainly no. 
 
If a man who calls himself a Sufi does something contrary to the Qurʾān and the Sunna, that deed must be rejected. It would be unfair, however, to infer at once that such conduct is what Sufism teaches. 
 
The same principle applies to every discipline and school. A jurist’s fault does not invalidate jurisprudence[3]. A theologian’s error does not abolish theology. The conduct of some members of a legal school does not automatically become its doctrine. 
 
Behind this particular defence of Sufism stands a more general rule. A tradition must be distinguished from those who claim it, its principles from distortions of them, and its authentic teaching from abuses committed in its name. 
 
This distinction is one of the most important keys to the book.

In Defence of the Great Sufi Masters 
 
The shaykh also expresses his surprise at attacks on Imam al-Junayd, Abū Yazīd al-Bistāmī, Dhū al-Nūn al-Misrī and other great figures in the history of Sufism[4]. 
 
In particular, he reproaches his opponent for attributing to them words and deeds said to contravene the noble sacred law[5], without always producing evidence precise enough to establish that what he imputes to them really merits censure. 
 
The question is not whether those men were infallible. It is whether historical figures can be condemned on vague allegations, isolated quotations or accounts whose reliability and context have not been examined. 
 
The demand for fairness is again a major theme of the epistle. An intellectual opponent, too, is entitled to justice. 
 
Contradictions in the Opposing Argument 
 
The shaykh also draws attention to contradictions within his opponent’s reasoning. 
 
He gives, in particular, the example of a statement attributed to Yahyā ibn Yahyā: 
 
“The Khārijites[6] are dearer to me than the Sufis.” 
 
The statement is put forward as an argument against the Sufi path. Yet the same writer says elsewhere that the statement of a Companion is not by itself binding proof. 
 
The shaykh therefore asks how one can deny an entire class of testimony any weight when it does not suit one’s argument, then turn an individual opinion into decisive proof when it appears to do so. 
 
Beyond the immediate controversy lies a lesson that has lost none of its force. The method must not change according to whether the evidence pleases us. 
 
A fair inquiry applies the same standards to evidence for and against its conclusion. 
 
Sufism in the Testimony of Scholars 
 
Having examined the main accusations, the shaykh widens his inquiry considerably. 
 
He is no longer content to show that a hostile quotation is weak or misapplied. He seeks to establish Sufism’s place in the Islamic tradition by bringing together a large body of scholarly testimony. 
 
The epistle thus becomes a wide-ranging inquiry across generations.

The shaykh draws on sayings attributed to many figures in Islam, from the earliest generations to scholars much closer to his own time. Jurists, hadith scholars, theologians, spiritual masters and writers of different schools are all called on to testify. 
 
The abundance of quotations is not incidental. It answers the charge that Sufism was foreign to Islam, appeared late and had no real roots in the tradition of scholarship. 
 
The shaykh seeks to show instead how deeply the purification of the heart, the discipline of the soul, sincerity, detachment, remembrance of Allah, inward vigilance and ihsān[7] run through the history of Muslim spirituality. 
 
He quotes Imam al-Shātibī in al-Muwāfaqāt: 
 
“The Sufis are authorities in their disciplines. By common agreement, they are those whom Allah has chosen from among His creatures.” 
 
And again:

“Allah has made this company the elect among His friendsand elevated them above all people without distinction, after the Messengers and Prophets, peace be upon them.”[8]
 
In his commentary on the Hikam of Ibn ʿAtāʾ Allāh, Shaykh Ahmad Zarrūq al-Burnusī uses a particularly striking comparison for the relation between jurisprudence and Sufism: 
 
“It stands in the place of the spirit, while jurisprudence is its body. It can manifest only in the body, just as the body cannot subsist without the spirit.” 
 
And in his commentary on passages by al-Shushtarī he writes: 
 
“The righteous among Allah’s friends have followed the Sufi path. Its fruits have appeared in many of Allah’s servants. It has numbered men who observed the ordinances of the sacred law and the courtesies of spiritual reality[9]. They attached themselves to the Names of the Lord of all worlds and took on the character of the Master of the Messengers … When they are remembered, mercies descend, and through their presence afflictions are lifted.” 
 
With such passages the shaykh shifts the debate. Before condemning Sufism on account of certain contested practices, one should ask what its masters and scholars understood by it. 
 
What Kind of Sufism Does the Epistle Defend? 
 
This is a point the reader should consider particularly closely. 
 
The Sufism Shaykh al-ʿAlāwī defends cannot be reduced to an order, a garment, a ceremony, a body of popular customs or extraordinary phenomena. 
 
In the many definitions and quotations gathered throughout the epistle, it appears above all as a discipline of purification and inward formation. 
 
It calls for work on sincerity, intention, conduct and presence of heart. It entails detachment from the passions and resistance to pride, ostentation, envy, love of reputation and disordered attachment to the world. 
 
In other words, what is at issue is the believer’s inward transformation. 
 
A person may know the rules of an act of worship yet remain inwardly governed by maladies of the heart. Two men can perform the same prayer outwardly. One may seek the regard of others, while the other sincerely seeks Allah’s pleasure. 
 
Jurisprudence teaches, among other things, how an act is to be performed in accordance with the Law. Sufism, in the sense defended by the authorities cited in the epistle, pays particular attention to the person performing it and to the state of the heart. 
 
It is not necessarily a matter of choosing between jurisprudence and Sufism. It is a question of how outward conformity and inward reform can complement each other. 
 
The Epistle Does Not Evade Controversial Questions 
 
Part of the epistle’s interest lies in the fact that the shaykh does not confine himself to the least disputed definitions of Sufism. 
 
As his argument unfolds, the shaykh encounters more delicate questions that have sometimes been fiercely debated in Muslim history, including fanāʾ[10], shatahāt[11], samāʿ[12], certain forms of dhikr[13], and the charges of hulūl or ittihād[14] levelled at certain mystics. 
 
Thus the work brings in such writers as Ibn Taymiyya, Ibn Qayyim al-Jawziyya, al-Ghazālī, al-Qushayrī, al-Shātibī, Ahmad Zarrūq, al-Shādhilī and many others. 
 
Their diversity is instructive. The history of Sufism cannot be reduced to a simple choice between “for” and “against”. 
 
Some scholars defend its principles while sharply criticising certain excesses. Others distinguish masters known for their fidelity to the sacred law from individuals they censure for objectionable language or conduct. 
 
This very capacity to make distinctions is what the epistle seeks to bring back into the debate. 
 
A Controversy That Teaches a Method 
 
Nāsir Maʿrūf is undeniably a defence. Its voice is sometimes firm, polemical and incisive. It would be artificial to try to efface that aspect of the work. 
 
But to reduce the book to a historical quarrel would be to deprive it of much of its interest. 
 
Its questions reach far beyond the controversy that gave rise to it. How is a quotation verified? How is a tradition to be judged if it is known chiefly through its opponents? Can a person’s conduct be turned into a collective doctrine? How can legitimate criticism be distinguished from an unwarranted generalisation? Can we accept a true statement from someone with whom we disagree? 
 
Read in that light, Nāsir Maʿrūf also teaches intellectual fairness.

- Learn before judging.
- Verify before attributing.
- Distinguish before generalising. 
 
And apply to opposing arguments the standards we would want applied to our own. 
 
This is a substantial part of what the epistle has to teach about method. 
 
The Commendations at the End of the Epistle 
 
The commendations at the end of the epistle show how important several scholars of the time considered this work. 
 
Among them were Shaykh Tawfīq al-Ayyūbī al-Ansārī, Shaykh Muhammad Hāshim Rashīd, Shaykh Zayn al-ʿĀbidīn al-Tūnisī and Shaykh Jamīl al-Shattī, the Hanbalī mufti of Damascus, as well as other scholars. 
 
These commendations do not, of course, take the place of examining the arguments in the book. They are nonetheless interesting historical evidence of the epistle’s reception and show that the controversy to which Shaykh al-ʿAlāwī responded went beyond a personal exchange. 
 
Why Add a Reader’s Guide? 
 
This edition has two aims. 
 
The first part presents the epistle itself in a translation that seeks to remain faithful to the Arabic while avoiding the heaviness of an excessively literal rendering. 
 
Qurʾānic verses and hadiths are presented in English. Technical terms are retained where an English equivalent would obscure an important distinction. 
 
But translating the words is not always enough to make a work intelligible. 
 
Shaykh al-ʿAlāwī wrote for an audience that shared references unfamiliar to many readers today. His contemporaries could follow terms such as tasawwuf, sharīʿa, haqīqa, ihsān, tazkiya, nafs, dhikr, zuhd, waraʿ, fanāʾ, shatahāt, dhawq and kashf without the explanations now needed by readers new to these disciplines. 
 
Likewise, some quotations presuppose that readers can distinguish legal proof from historical testimony, a spiritual saying from personal experience, and all of these from a doctrinal claim. 
 
For that reason the edition includes a separate guide. 
 
It is not part of the original epistle, and it should always be distinguished from Shaykh al-ʿAlāwī’s words. It gives readers a way into the work, explains its vocabulary, puts arguments in context and clarifies passages that may be misunderstood if read without preparation. 
 
Understanding Before Taking Sides 
 
The second part does not seek to impose a ready-made opinion. 
 
Its aim is more modest and, we hope, more useful. It offers readers what they need to understand the matter before taking a position. 
 
It explains, among other things, how jurisprudence relates to Sufism, how the sacred law relates to spiritual reality, what purification of the soul means, and what place dhikr and ihsān have. It also takes up several delicate ideas that recur in controversies about Sufism. 
 
Particular attention is paid to terms such as fanāʾ, shatahāt, hulūl, ittihād, dhawq and kashf. A literal equivalent or a brief definition can easily suggest the wrong meaning. 
 
The guide points out that an individual’s spiritual experience does not thereby become a new source of law. Personal unveiling does not set aside the sacred law. Spiritual taste does not constitute legal proof binding on others. And an expression uttered in a particular state must be examined before it is turned into a theological proposition. 
 
The aim is to help readers distinguish these kinds of discourse. 
 
How the Two Parts Work Together 
 
The book can therefore be approached in several ways. 
 
Readers already familiar with the Islamic sciences can go straight to the epistle and consult the guide when clarification is needed. 
 
Readers new to Sufism can work through the epistle at their own pace and use the second part to clarify terms and arguments. 
 
Students may want to move back and forth between the two, reading the text, consulting the explanation and then returning to the text. The aim is to make the reader more independent rather than to have the guide take the place of the epistle. 
 
The first part, then, seeks to be faithful to Shaykh al-ʿAlāwī’s voice. 
 
The second seeks to meet the contemporary reader’s need to understand that voice. 
 
One sets out the arguments. The other gives the reader a way into them. 
 
One lets us hear the shaykh. The other accompanies the person listening. 
 
Who Is This Book For? 
 
This edition is intended neither solely for people already affiliated with Sufism nor solely for those who disagree with it. 
 
It is for anyone who wants to understand what its defenders actually sought to protect and what they meant by Sufism. 
 
It may therefore interest a Muslim reader encountering Sufism for the first time, a student of the Islamic sciences, someone already familiar with the tradition, or anyone trying to understand the place of spirituality in Islam and the debates to which it has given rise. 
 
Readers are not being asked to suspend their critical judgement. 
 
On the contrary, the epistle itself continually asks us to examine, compare, verify and distinguish. 
 
But criticism is fruitful only when it addresses what another person actually maintains, rather than a simplified picture of their thought. 
 
It is in this spirit that we offer Nāsir Maʿrūf to English-speaking readers. 
 
May Allah make this work a means of beneficial knowledge, clarification and a drawing together of hearts around the truth. May He grant us sincerity in inquiry, fairness in judgement and the ability to recognise the truth wherever it comes from. May He protect us alike from excess in our attachments and injustice towards those with whom we disagree, and guide us on a straight path. 
 
And our final prayer is that all praise belongs to Allah, Lord of all worlds. 
 
Derwīsh al-ʿAlāwī




[1] Nāsir Maʿrūf is the short form of the pen name al-Nāṣir Maʿrūf. For the serial publication and the separate edition, see the Mostaganem manuscript catalogue, Manuscrit_A_075, sixth text, pp. 59–60. The preface to the second Arabic edition places the serial publication in the late 1930s, which conflicts with this chronology and with the shaykh’s death in 1934. 
[2] Talbīs Iblīs means “The Deception of Iblīs”. In this work the Hanbalī scholar Ibn al-Jawzī examines the ways in which Satan makes falsehood appear attractive to different groups, including theologians, hadith scholars, devotees and ascetics. 
[3] Fiqh is Islamic jurisprudence, the human understanding and interpretation of the rulings of the sharīʿa. 
[4] Taṣawwuf is the Arabic term commonly rendered as “Sufism”. 
[5] The sharīʿa is the revealed or sacred law. 
[6] The Khārijites (Khawārij) arose in the first century AH, in the period of ʿAlī ibn Abī Tālib. Some groups among them held that a Muslim who committed a grave sin was no longer a believer. 
[7] Ihsān means excellence or doing what is good and beautiful. In the hadith of Jibrīl it is distinguished from islām (submission) and imān (faith). 
[8] Awliyāʾ, plural of walī, means Allah’s friends, those known for piety and closeness to Him. 
[9] Haqīqa means “reality” or “truth”. Here it refers to the inward realisation of spiritual truth. 
[10] Fanāʾ means effacement or extinction. Its precise sense depends upon the passage, especially where the text distinguishes a loss of self-awareness from a claim about existence. 
[11] Shatahāt are ecstatic utterances, often paradoxical to a hearer unfamiliar with the speaker’s state and language. 
[12] Samāʿ means listening or audition and here refers to spiritual listening. 
[13] Dhikr is remembrance of Allah, with the heart and tongue. 
[14] In the doctrinal sense discussed here, hulūl means the divine dwelling in a created being, while ittihād means union in a sense that would abolish the distinction between the Creator and the creature. Neither should be confused with a description of a spiritual state or the effacement of self-awareness. 
 
 
 
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